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Juvenile (In)Justice: How Juvenile Pretr ial 
Detention in Maryland Violates the Juvenile 
Causes Act & Supreme Cour t Jur isprudence 
By Sarah McHenry 
 
ABSTRACT 
Maryland’s Juvenile Causes Act states that children alleged delinquent 
should only be removed from the home as a last resort and subsequently 
provided a safe, humane, and caring environment while in the custody in 
the state. However, children in Maryland are regularly detained prior to 
adjudication, and many for non-violent offenses, such as technical 
violations. These children are detained in pretrial detention centers, where 
safety concerns and abuse allegations are reported regularly. 
This comment will argue that Maryland is violating its juvenile statutes & 
case law by detaining children prior to adjudication in its pretrial detention 
centers. The statutory role of Juvenile Services, if the juvenile is in State 
custody, is to provide for “safe, humane, and caring environment[s]” and to 
secure for the child “custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible 
equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents” only if it is 
necessary to remove a child at all from the home.1 Maryland instead 
unnecessarily detains juveniles prior to adjudication: first, at rates higher 
than necessary; second, for offenses that should not be weighed in the 
public interest (such as technical violations); third, in conditions that do not 
                     
1 See MD. CODE CTS. & JUD. PROC § 3-8A-02(a)(5) (2017). 
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satisfy the “safe, humane, and caring environment” requirement of the 
statute.2 
The comment discusses Maryland’s Courts & Judicial Proceedings 
Article, §3-8A-02, along with the case law that explains it. The comment 
argues that Maryland is violating its code and case law by unnecessarily 
detaining children in placements that are fundamentally unsafe, 
dehumanizing, and ineffective. It explains how the Supreme Court has 
differentiated between adults and children in recent cases (ranging from 
Roper v. Simmons to Montgomery v. Louisiana) and then provides empirical 
evidence from scientific studies in order to lay the foundation that children 
are extraordinarily different from adults in that they are more susceptible to 
the psychological trauma of incarceration. The comment concludes by 
recommending that alternatives to detention, such as community-based 
treatment and therapeutic foster care, are in the best interest of the child, the 
community, and the state for therapeutic, safety, and financial reasons. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until the day of the school fight in the spring of 2013, Tanika had been a 
perfect student.3 Though no one was injured in the skirmish between her 
and another girl, the state of Maryland nonetheless decided to charge her 
with second-degree assault.4 Tanika had been an honors student and did not 
have a history of delinquent behavior, and therefore, the Department of 
Juvenile Services recommended the case be dismissed.5 The prosecutor, 
                     
2 See id. 
3 See Erica Goode, Judge in Maryland Locks Up Youths and Rules Their Lives, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/us/judge-in-maryland-
locks-up-youths-and-rules-their-lives.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QY99-VUD8]. 
4 See id. (noting that there were no injuries to any parties during the fight, although 
there was property damage); see also MD. CODE CRIM. LAW §§ 3-201, 3-203 (2017) 
(defining the crime of second-degree assault in Maryland). 
5 See id. (noting that the Maryland Department of Juvenile Service has the option to 
recommend dismissal of a charge or can informally adjust the matter of a juvenile). 
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however, went forward with the charge.6 When Tanika missed her court 
date, the presiding judge issued a writ to detain her in a secure facility 
pending adjudication.7 
Tanika spent an entire month detained in Thomas J. Waxter Children’s 
Center (Waxter), a maximum-security detention center for girls in Laurel, 
Maryland.8 The judge sent her there despite her outstanding grades, her 
close relationship with her mother, and her otherwise spotless discipline 
record.9 At Waxter, Tanika lived in a traumatizing environment with girls 
who had significantly more severe behavioral and mental health needs.10 
Tanika was miserable and frequently broke down crying.11 When Tanika 
finally returned to the court and pled guilty to her charge, Judge Walton 
ruled that she was delinquent and needed services from the court, 
disregarding Tanika’s spotless history.12 
                     
6 See id.; see also MD. CODE CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-10(h) (2017) (recognizing that 
a State’s Attorney can pursue a matter if any party appeals, including the victim, the 
person who filed the complaint, and the arresting police officer). 
7 See Goode, supra note 3 (highlighting presiding judge’s power over Tanika’s case). 
8 See Goode, supra note 3 (reporting that Tanika was sent to Laurel for pretrial 
detention); Tamieka Briscoe, Rise in Suicidal Behavior at Waxter Girls’ Detention 
Center, CAP. NEWS SERV., PHILIP MERRILL C. JOURNALISM (Apr. 18, 2014), 
http://cnsmaryland.org/2014/04/18/rise-in-suicidal-behavior-at-waxter-girls-detention-
center/ (stating that Waxter Children’s Center is a female juvenile detention facility in 
Laurel) [https://perma.cc/2XNY-TC87]. 
9 See Goode, supra note 3 (noting the mitigating factors that Judge Walton had 
available when ruling to detain Tamika). 
10 See Briscoe, supra note 8 (reporting on the rise in suicidal behavior at Waxter 
Children’s Center and prevalence of trauma in detained juveniles); Scott McFarlane, 
Dozens of Girls in Maryland Juvenile Detention Centers Are Victims of Sex Trafficking, 
NBC NEWS 4 WASH. (Sept. 11, 2014), 
http://www.nbcwashington.com/investigations/Dozens-of-Girls-in-Maryland-Juvenile-
Detention-Centers-Are-Victims-of-Sex-Trafficking-274832081.html (reporting on the 
rise of sex trafficking reports at Waxter Children’s Center) [https://perma.cc/8XAK-
BDL4]. 
11 See Goode, supra note 3 (describing Tanika’s volatile emotional state during 
detention). 
12 See id.; see also MD. RULE 11-112(a) (permitting pretrial detention of juveniles). 
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The Maryland Juvenile Causes Act emphasizes the interest of the State in 
the maintenance and strengthening of the family unit.13 While the Act gives 
judges the power to remove a child from their home, it specifies that 
removing a child is only to be done when necessary for the welfare of the 
child or the good of public safety.14 If detention is absolutely necessary, the 
State has an obligation under the Act to provide a comfortable and safe 
environment for the youth.15 In the case of Tanika, as well as many other 
youths, the State of Maryland grossly violates these statutory obligations, 
resulting in a generation of traumatized children who are more likely to 
have mental health issues and become involved in the adult criminal justice 
system.16 
This Comment argues that Maryland courts violate the purposes of the 
Juvenile Causes Act by excessively and inappropriately detaining children 
before trial in unsafe detention centers.17 Part II discusses the development 
of Supreme Court juvenile precedent and explains the Maryland Juvenile 
Causes Act.18 Part III argues that Maryland courts violate the Act’s 
                     
13 See id.; see also § 3-8A-02(a)(5) (stressing that conserving a child’s ties to his family 
should be the priority of the System). 
14 See MD. RULE 11-112(a) (authorizing judges or intake officers to detain a child if it is 
in the best interest of the child or the community); see also MD. CODE § 3-8A-02(a)(5) 
(2017); see also MD. CODE § 3-8A-15(b) (granting judges, magistrates, and intake 
officers the power to detain a child prior to a hearing if the child is likely to leave the 
jurisdiction). 
15 See MD. CODE § 3-8A-02(a)(6)-(7) (mandating the Department of Juvenile Services to 
provide a safe, caring, and humane environment to children in custody, along with access 
to required services and care as close as possible to what should have been provided by 
his parents). 
16 See Patrick McCarthy et al., The Future of Youth Justice: A Community-Based 
Alternative to the Youth Prison Model, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. (Oct. 2016) 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/ocpa/cms/files/criminal-justice/research-
publications/ntcc_the_future_of_youth_justice.pdf (providing a meta-analysis of studies 
that conclude juvenile detention and commitment increase the risk of lower educational 
attainment, mental illness, and criminal behavior) [https://perma.cc/N6A7-PP8R]. 
17 See MD. CODE CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-01 (2017). 
18 See infra Part II (discussing the Maryland Juvenile Causes Act, Maryland statutory 
interpretation, and Supreme Court Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as it applies to 
juveniles). 
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unambiguous purpose clause sections pertaining to children alleged 
delinquent by unnecessarily detaining them in violent detention centers.19 
Part III additionally argues that even if the Juvenile Causes Act is 
ambiguous, recent Supreme Court juvenile jurisprudence mandates a stricter 
standard for pretrial detention.20 
This Comment recommends in Part V that the state of Maryland 
drastically reduce all pretrial detention of juveniles and instead invest in 
community-based interventions to serve youth awaiting adjudication.21 
Finally, this Comment concludes that Maryland’s current practice of 
inappropriately detaining children prior to adjudication violates the Juvenile 
Causes Act and is contrary to Supreme Court juvenile jurisprudence.22 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Maryland Juvenile Causes Act 
Until the turn of the twentieth century, Maryland, along with the vast 
majority of the country, prosecuted children over the age of seven in the 
adult court system.23 This “barbaric” penal system resulted in cases such as 
State v. Guild, where the court imposed the death penalty on a twelve-year-
old child after finding that his uncorroborated confession was sufficient 
evidence to convict him of murder.24 
                     
19 See infra Part III (explaining how juveniles alleged delinquent, as defined by the 
Maryland law, are inappropriately detained in punitive facilities). 
20 See infra Part III (arguing that the current pretrial detention practices of Maryland 
violate the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause). 
21 See infra Part IV (advancing the recommendations of best practices in juvenile justice 
reform). 
22 See infra Part V (arguing that Maryland’s current practice of unnecessarily detaining 
youth prior to trial in unsafe detention violates the Juvenile Causes Act, as well as the 
Eighth Amendment). 
23 See In re Johnson, 255 A.2d 419, 422 (Md. 1969) (describing the background of the 
Juvenile Causes Act, noting that children below the age of seven were considered 
incapable of criminal intent). 
24 See State v. Guild, 10 N.J.L. 163, 189 (1828) (affirming the conviction and death 
sentence of a twelve-year-old boy despite an uncorroborated confession, which would be 
352 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
In response to the growing public outrage over the inhumane treatment of 
juveniles, Maryland established a separate jurisdiction for children alleged 
delinquent under the age of sixteen in 1902.25 In 1969, the General 
Assembly of Maryland passed a comprehensive set of laws, known today as 
the Juvenile Causes Act, to further protect the rights of juveniles in court.26  
The following year, in In re Hamill, the Court of Special Appeals 
interpreted the Act, holding that the Legislature intended to preserve 
juvenile court as a special, non-punitive type of proceeding that addresses 
the unique needs of adolescents.27 
Today, Maryland circuit courts may sit as juvenile courts and retain 
exclusive jurisdiction over any child under the age of eighteen alleged to be 
delinquent, with limited exceptions.28 The Juvenile Causes Act guides 
Maryland courts, ensuring that the proceedings fall under the civil law, 
rather than criminal law.29 The Act guarantees the preservation of the family 
                                            
unconstitutional under Supreme Court precedent today); see also In re Johnson, 255 A.2d 
at 421; Abe Fortas, Equal Rights - For Whom? 42 N.Y.U. L.REV. 401, 405-06 (1967) 
(describing the outcry against the prosecution of juvenile matters in adult courts) 
[https://perma.cc/5E5A-RWGD]. 
25 See In re Johnson, 255 A.2d at 422 (noting that Maryland created a separate 
jurisdiction for juveniles in 1902 as a result of public opinion and evolving standards of 
decency). 
26 See 1969 Md. Laws 82; see also In re Hamill, 271 A.2d 762, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1970) (noting that the Juvenile Laws were substantially revised in 1969 but retained the 
same purposes). 
27 See In re Hamill, 271 A.2d at 764 (interpreting the nature of the statute found in 1969 
Md. Laws 82). 
28 See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-03 (2017) (expanding the jurisdiction 
of the court to all children under eighteen who are alleged delinquent, except children 
over fourteen who are alleged to have committed a crime punishable by life 
imprisonment and children over sixteen who are alleged to have committed a specified 
set of crimes stated in § 3-8A-03(d)(4) or have violated the Transportation Article). 
29 See In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 90 (Md. 1994) (announcing that Maryland Courts 
have consistently interpreted juvenile laws to reflect the special civil nature of juvenile 
proceedings). 
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unit except when the child’s welfare or public safety demands it.30 For 
example, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals ruled in In re Julianna B. 
that a judge may confine any juvenile who presents a “present threat” to 
public safety.31 If a child is removed from the home, the Act demands a safe 
and humane environment for children in state custody.32 In State v. Kanavy, 
this provision was tragically tested when a child died while in Department 
of Juvenile Services (DJS) custody.33 Finally, due to the 1997 amendments 
to the Juvenile Causes Act, the court may now consider a variety of factors 
during the disposition of a delinquent child, including public safety, the 
accountability of the child to the community due to the delinquent act, and 
the development of the child’s character.34 
The purposes of the Juvenile Causes Act are varied and apply to different 
actors in the system.35 For example, Maryland must provide the same level 
                     
30 See In re Hamill, 271 A.2d at 764; In re Appeal No. 179, 327 A.2d 793, 794 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1974) (ruling that no juvenile may be separated from his family unless public 
safety or his welfare demands it). 
31 See In re Julianna B., 947 A.2d 90, 134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (insisting the lower 
court abused its discretion for denying community visits to a juvenile who presented no 
evidence of violent behavior; also noting that the juvenile was initially detained and 
subsequently committed due to the severity of her second-degree murder charge) 
(vacated on other grounds, 967 A.2d 776 (Md. 2009)). 
32 See State v. Kanavy, 4 A.3d 991, 995 (Md. 2010) (reviewing the language of MD. 
CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02 in finding that DJS employees owed a duty of 
medical care and provision of a safe and humane environment to the child who died in 
their custody). 
33 See id. at 996 (explaining that DJS employees were clearly subjected to the plain 
language of § 3-8A-02 when a child died in DJS custody). 
34 See In re Saifu K., 978 A.2d 881, 889 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (analyzing the 1997 
amendments to the Juvenile Causes Act to reach the conclusion that the legislature sought 
to change the purpose of juvenile justice law for delinquent youth to a system of 
accountability); MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(1) (2017) (stating that the 
Juvenile Justice System must ensure the balance of certain objectives for children who 
have committed delinquent acts). 
35 See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-8A-02(a)(1)-(2), 3-8A-02(a)(5), 3-8A-
02(a)(7) (2017) (specifying different responsibilities for various actors coming within the 
provisions of the subtitle, including delinquent children, the Juvenile Justice System, and 
parents of delinquent children). 
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of care and services provided to children at home and in custody.36 A judge 
or magistrate may only remove a child to state custody from the home if 
necessary for his or her welfare or for public safety purposes.37 Overall, the 
Act is “civil in nature” and not intended to be punitive.38 
B. Maryland Statutory Interpretation 
The canons of statutory construction are “well-settled” in Maryland.39 
The trier of fact’s goal is to determine the intent of the General Assembly.40 
The trier of fact focuses their inquiry on the plain words of the statute, being 
careful not to add, delete, overemphasize, or underemphasize words or 
phrases.41 For example, in Taylor v. NationsBank, the Court of Appeals 
looked at a statutory definition according to the canons of statutory 
construction when determining whether information disclosed orally was 
considered “account information.”42 The Court looked at the plain language 
of the statute to make its ruling. As the statute’s plain language did not 
contain the word “oral,” it held that statute was not violated because the 
definition made no reference to oral information and solely concerned 
written records or copies.43 
                     
36 See id. § 3-8A-02(a)(6)-(7) (ensuring that the parental “custody, care, and discipline,” 
as well as safe and humane care, will be provided to any child in State custody). 
37 See id. § 3-8A-02(a)(5) (stating that the principal purpose is to conserve and 
strengthen the family unit, and to only separate it if absolutely necessary). 
38 See In re Victor B., 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (Md. 1994) (holding that the Maryland 
Courts have consistently interpreted the purpose of juvenile proceedings as “civil in 
nature”). 
39 Taylor v. NationsBank, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (Md. 2001) (providing the background of 
statutory interpretation in Maryland). 
40 See id. (emphasizing that the ultimate objective for the canons of construction is to 
discern a legislature’s intent). 
41 See id. (explaining the steps of statutory interpretation). 
42 See id. (reviewing §§ 1-302 and 1-301(b)(1) of the Financial Institutions Article in 
their “plain terms”). 
43 See id. at 656 (holding that because the respondent possessed no financial records as 
defined by § 1-301(b)(1), he did not violate the statute). 
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C. United States Supreme Court Juvenile Jurisprudence 
Over the past twelve years, the United States Supreme Court has 
increasingly recognized the special nature of children in the criminal justice 
system.44 Beginning with Roper v. Simmons in 2005, the Supreme Court 
struck down the death penalty for children and has since developed a 
precedent that distinguishes children as radically different from adults.45 
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the execution of any 
person under the age of eighteen was unconstitutional under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.46 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court relied upon a consensus among states against the 
practice and the diminished capacity of youth.47 The Court found a 
consensus among states by first looking at the twenty states that permitted 
capital punishment and how infrequently they issued a death sentence.48 
The Court then found that the underdevelopment of a youth’s personality 
and morals results in lessened culpability in the eyes of the law, as a youth’s 
impulsive destructive act stems from immaturity, rather than 
premeditation.49 
The Supreme Court extended the holding of Roper in 2010 by ruling in 
Graham v. Florida that mandatory life without parole sentences for 
                     
44 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 82 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (holding that children are constitutionally different than 
adults). 
45 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (holding the death penalty for juveniles violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause). 
46 See id. (holding the death penalty for juveniles violates Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution due to juveniles’ reduced capacity 
of culpability). 
47 See id. (noting that the irresponsibility of juveniles renders them unable to plan ahead, 
understand the scope of their actions, or appreciate consequences before it is too late, and 
therefore their actions are less morally reprehensible). 
48 See id. at 565 (noting that even in the twenty jurisdictions that permitted the death 
penalty for juveniles, only three had so done in the past ten years). 
49 See id. (holding that the immaturity and lack of capacity for premeditation renders 
youths to have a diminished capacity, and thus unable to receive capital punishment). 
356 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
juveniles who commit nonhomicidal offenses violated the Cruel & Unusual 
Punishment Clause.50 The Court found a national consensus against the 
sentencing practice.51 In thirty-seven jurisdictions where laws permitted 
courts to sentence juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without parole, the 
lower courts were not applying the sentences.52 Subsequently, the majority 
looked to why the practice was cruel, finding most notably that children’s 
brains are radically different than those of adults.53 As the brain continues to 
grow throughout adolescence, children are more capable of change than 
adults.54 
After Graham, the Court applied its reasoning in Miller v. Alabama and 
retroactively in Montgomery v. Louisiana, determining that juvenile life 
sentences for homicide offenses were logically analogous to the death 
penalty.55 The Court reemphasized that children could not be treated as 
miniature versions of adults.56 The Court further developed the reasoning 
from three precepts formed in Roper by using the support of advancements 
in social and biological science.57 First, children have a severe lack of 
maturity, which leads to an increased likelihood of recklessness and 
                     
50 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding mandatory life without parole 
for juveniles who commit nonhomicidal offenses violates the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (holding the death 
penalty for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause). 
51 Graham, 560 U.S. at 59, 61–62 (explaining which type of legal test to apply to 
Graham). 
52 See id. at 62 (finding that the actual sentencing of juveniles to life without parole was 
so infrequent that it was indicative of a consensus against the practice). 
53 See id. at 68 (discussing the recent developments in neuropsychology and social 
science that distinguish children from adults). 
54 See id. (determining that children are less likely to be incorrigible than adults due to 
their increased capacity for change). 
55 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012) (holding mandatory juvenile life 
sentences unconstitutional); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016) 
(holding that mandatory juvenile life sentences are unconstitutional retroactively). 
56 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 470 (emphasizing that children are not miniature adults due to 
their development and vulnerability). 
57 See id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (2005)). 
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impulsivity.58 Second, children are psychologically and socially more 
vulnerable than adults.59 Finally, a child’s character and personality is 
neither socially nor neurologically formed before the age of eighteen; it 
continues to mature until he reaches adulthood.60 These developments in 
neuroscience and psychology support the notion that children are 
significantly less likely to become incorrigible and can benefit from 
rehabilitation.61 
The Court incorporated the reasoning of Roper-Graham-Miller-
Montgomery in the 2011 Fifth Amendment case of J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina.62 The Court determined that any Miranda custody analysis must 
include consideration of a suspect’s age.63 Justice Sotomayor, writing for 
the Court, emphasized that police interrogations are particularly traumatic 
for children.64 Compared to adult defendants, children are more 
psychologically helpless, more likely to falsely confess, more likely to be 
manipulated by adults, and less likely to understand the process of an 
interrogation.65 The Court again stressed that children are not to be treated 
like miniature adults at any stage of the criminal process because of their 
vulnerability and lack of maturity.66 
                     
58 See id. (noting that the immaturity of juveniles leads to impulsive decision-making and 
reckless actions). 
59 See id. at 470 (noting the children’s increased vulnerability and differences in loci of 
control between children and adults, due to institutional limits on children). 
60 See id. (comparing the neuroplasticity between youths and adults). 
61 See id. at 476. 
62 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011) (noting that the Court has 
already observed in Roper, Miller, and Graham that children are more susceptible to 
outside pressures than adults). 
63 See id. at 264 (holding that because interrogations are inherently coercive, the Miranda 
custody analysis should include consideration of a suspect’s age). 
64 See id. at 269 (citing amici curiae briefs that highlight the exceptional rate of false 
confessions from youth). 
65 See id. at 269–72 (explaining the multiple disadvantages of youth while in custody due 
to their misplaced trust in police and lack of experience, perspective, and judgment). 
66 See id. at 272. 
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The Court has not always set such progressive precedent for children’s 
rights, however.67 Schall v. Martin, in 1984, upheld a New York statute that 
authorized juvenile pretrial detention against claims that it violated due 
process.68 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, opined that New York 
State’s legitimate interest in protecting the community from juvenile crime 
outweighed a juvenile’s interest in freedom.69 The Court determined that the 
New York statute did not amount to punishment because it included 
provisions such as expedited hearings and suitable conditions of 
confinement.70 The legitimacy of the New York statute was additionally 
supported by the prevalence of similar statutes in every state and the 
District of Columbia, including a comparable statute found in the Maryland 
Annotated Code today.71 
                     
67 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256–57 (1984) (upholding a New York State 
statute against a due process challenge, authorizing pretrial detention for juveniles). 
68 See id. (determining the New York statute served a legitimate state regulatory 
objective by protecting public safety and the juveniles themselves without serving as a 
punishment). 
69 See id. at 265 (recognizing that a juvenile is always in custody, whether in that of his 
parents or of the state, because children are assumed to not be able to take care of 
themselves). 
70 See id. at 269 (noting the expedited procedural protections afforded to youths detained 
under the New York statute). 
71 See id. at 267 (giving weight to the fact that the practice was followed by a large 
number of jurisdictions because it helps to determine whether a practice offends key 
principal of justice) (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952)) (internal 
quotations omitted); MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-15 (2017) (authorizing a 
judge or intake officer to take a child into custody prior to a hearing). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Through the Unnecessary Use of Pretrial Detention in Unsafe Facilities, 
the Maryland Courts Violate the Stated Purposes of Juvenile Causes Act  
1. Maryland Unnecessar ily Uses Pretr ial Detention in Violation of the 
Juvenile Causes Act  
The Purposes clause of the Juvenile Causes Act directs a magistrate or 
judge to remove a child from the home only when necessary.72 While a trier 
of law may commit a delinquent child to the custody of the State based on a 
finding of delinquency, the same Purpose clause subtitles do not apply to a 
child alleged delinquent. However, Maryland unnecessarily detains children 
alleged delinquent in violation of the Act by removing them when it is 
neither for their welfare nor in the interest of public safety.73 
An analysis of the text of the Juvenile Causes Act demonstrates that the 
Act makes several distinctions between key actors in the Juvenile Justice 
System.74 The Act distinguishes a delinquent child from a child alleged as 
delinquent.75 A delinquent child, according to the Act, is one who the court 
has found involved in a delinquent act and requires guidance, treatment, or 
rehabilitation.76 Guidance, treatment, and rehabilitation for a delinquent 
                     
72 See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(6) (2017) (stating that a child should be 
separated from his or her home only if necessary). 
73 See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, DOORS TO DJS COMMITMENT: WHAT DRIVES 
JUVENILE CONFINEMENT IN MARYLAND? 4 (2015), 
http://djs.maryland.gov/Documents/publications/AECF%20Assessment%20of%20MD%
20Dispositions%20-%20Updated%20March%2016%20-%20Final%20PDF.pdf 
(describing how Maryland courts unnecessarily detain children prior to trial through 
technical violations) [https://perma.cc/M7PA-K5DN]. 
74 See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(1)-(7) (2017) (differentiating purpose 
clauses based on the actor, such as the responsibilities of a parent of a delinquent child in 
§ 3-8A-02(a)(3), contrasted with the State’s obligation to a delinquent child in § 3-8A-
02(a)(1)). 
75 See id. § 3-8A-01(m) (providing the statutory definition of delinquent). 
76 Compare MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-01(m), and 3-8A-02(a)(1)–(3) 
(providing the statutory definition of delinquent and the statutory obligations for 
delinquent children), with §§ 3-8A-02 (a)(4)–(7) (mentioning only “children” and 
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child comes in the form of services from the court and DJS, which may 
involve commitment to a facility, drug treatment, or therapy, depending on 
the child’s needs.77 A child alleged delinquent is one who has received a 
citation for a violation of the Criminal or Education Laws, but the court has 
not yet found that the child was involved in the delinquent act or needs 
guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation.78 
The higher courts of Maryland have appropriately followed this 
distinction between delinquent children and children alleged delinquent.79 
Delinquent children are subjected to a variety of factors when the System 
(referring to the juvenile justice system, including the court, the State’s 
Attorney, DJS, and social services) is considering disposition, including 
public safety of the community, the accountability of the child to the 
community due to the delinquent act, and the development of the child’s 
character.80 This statutory language, such as the state having the obligation 
of maintaining “public safety and protection of the community” for 
delinquent children, allows judges to commit delinquent children to long-
                                            
“children coming within the provisions of this subtitle”); see also In re George V., 589 
A.2d 521, 522 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (describing the bifurcated process in in 
Maryland juvenile court of first determining involvement in the delinquent act, and then 
whether the child needs services). 
77 See In re Demetrius J., 583 A.2d 258, 259–60 (Md. 1991) (detailing the scope of 
DJS’s responsibilities concerning placement and services). 
78 See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-13 (describing the petition process for a 
child alleged delinquent); see also In re George V., 589 A.2d at 522 (describing the 
bifurcated process in Maryland juvenile court of first determining involvement and then 
whether the child is delinquent and needs services). 
79 See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(1)–(7) (2017) (differentiating 
purpose clauses based on the actor, such as the responsibilities of a parent of a delinquent 
child in § 3-8A-02(a)(3), contrasted with the State’s obligation to a delinquent child in § 
3-8A-02(a)(1)). 
80 See In re Saifu K., 978 A.2d at 889 (analyzing the 1997 amendments to the Juvenile 
Causes Act to reach the conclusion that the legislature sought to change the purpose of 
juvenile justice law for delinquent youth to a system of accountability); MD. CODE, CTS. 
& JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(1) (2017) (stating that the Juvenile Justice System must 
ensure the balance of certain objectives for children who have committed delinquent 
acts). 
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term placement after a finding of delinquency and an assessment for 
rehabilitation needs.81 Children alleged delinquent, however, have no such 
obligations imposed by the Act; instead, children alleged delinquent 
continue to be only subject to Purpose clause subtitles that do not apply to 
delinquent children.82 Similar to the early statutory mandates of 1969, these 
subtitles today include the state’s duty to preserve the family unit and 
separate a child from his parents only if necessary for the child’s welfare or 
in the interest of public safety.83 
Some may argue that the Juvenile Causes Act has changed over its fifty-
year history; therefore, case law interpreting its earlier versions does not 
apply today. When interpreting the language of a Maryland statute, 
however, one must use the “well-settled” canons of statutory construction.84 
The trier of law must discern the intent of the Legislature by looking at the 
plain language of the statute, being careful not to add, delete, 
overemphasize, or underemphasize words or phrases.85 If a statute uses two 
different terms or omits a term, it signifies that those terms are to be treated 
differently.86 For example, in Taylor v. NationsBank, the Court of Appeals 
                     
81 See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(1)–(7) (2017); In re George V., 589 
A.2d 521, 522 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (describing the bifurcated process by which a 
judge or magistrate first determines whether a juvenile was involved in a delinquent act, 
and then whether he is in need of services). 
82 Compare MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-8A-02(a)(4)–(7) (2017) (mentioning 
only “children” and “children coming within the provisions of this subtitle,”) with §§ 3-
8A-02(a)(1)–(3) (specifying “children who have committed delinquent acts” and 
“children found to be delinquent”). 
83 See id. § 3-8A-02(a)(6) (placing the emphasis on the strengthening of the family unit 
and forbidding the removal of a child from his home unless in his welfare or in the 
interest of public safety). 
84 See Taylor v. NationsBank, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (Md. 2001) (providing the background 
of statutory interpretation in Maryland); see also Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. 
Chase, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000) (establishing the tradition of statutory interpretation in 
Maryland). 
85 See Taylor, 776 A.2d at 654 (explaining the steps of statutory interpretation). 
86 See id. (explaining that the trier of law should not attempt to give the text a forced 
meaning or attempt to add or delete words in the text, as the trier of law should take the 
statute at plain meaning). 
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interpreted a section of the Financial Institutions Code of Maryland.87 In 
determining whether information disclosed orally was considered “account 
information,” the Court examined the statutory definition according to the 
canons of statutory construction.88 As the definition made no reference to 
oral information and solely concerned written records or copies, the Court 
held that the statute was not violated.89 
Applying this same logic to the Juvenile Causes Act, children alleged 
delinquent are not subject to the Purpose clause of the Act that apply to 
delinquent children because they do not meet, and have never met, the 
statutory definition.90 For example, the young woman we encountered in 
this Comment’s Introduction, Tanika, was only a child alleged delinquent 
when she was first detained at Waxter Children’s Center.91 She had only 
missed her status date, for which she was detained for a month in a 
traumatizing jail, isolated from her friends and family.92 
The Juvenile Causes Act directs the Juvenile Justice System to refrain 
from removing a child from the home unless it may be in the interest of 
public safety.93 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals ruled in In re 
Julianna B. that a judge may confine any juvenile who presents a “present 
                     
87 See id. at 655–56 (determining whether the respondent acted in violation of § 1-302 of 
the Financial Institutions Article when he disclosed information via telephone). 
88 See id. at 655. (reviewing §§ 1-302 and 1-301(b)(1) of the Financial Institutions 
Article in their “plain terms”). 
89 See Taylor v. NationsBank, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (Md. 2001) (holding that because the 
respondent possessed no financial records as defined by § 1-301(b)(1), he did not violate 
the statute). 
90 Compare MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-8A-02(a)(4)–(7) (2017) (mentioning 
only “children” and “children coming within the provisions of this subtitle,”) with §§ 3-
8A-02(a)(1)–(3) (2017) (specifying “children who have committed delinquent acts” and 
“children found to be delinquent”). 
91 See Goode, supra note 3 (reporting that Tanika was sent to Laurel for pretrial 
detention after missing her court date). 
92 See id. 
93 See id. § 3-8A-02 (allowing authorities of the system to remove a child only if it is in 
the best interest of the child or the community). 
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threat” to public safety.94 However, Maryland admits that juvenile 
confinement is not reserved for youth who pose a risk to the public.95 
Rather, a technical violation of probation or court rules, such as misuse of 
an electronic monitoring bracelet, is the most likely reason for a judge to 
confine a youth.96 Again, the young woman we encountered in this 
Comment’s Introduction, Tanika, was unnecessarily detained prior to trial 
due to a technical violation.97 Tanika’s charged offense was a minor school 
fight, so inconsequential that the intake officer had initially wanted to 
dismiss it.98 However, the judge detained Tanika when she missed her court 
date.99 Missing a court date is violating a court order, which in Maryland 
may be grounds for detention.100 At the time, Tanika was a youth alleged 
delinquent, which means the judge could not apply the Purpose subtitles 
relevant to delinquent youth in order to justify her detention.101 While 
Tanika was detained at Waxter Children’s Center, she suffered extreme 
emotional distress.102 She found the separation from her mother intolerable, 
                     
94 See In re Julianna B., 947 A.2d 90, 134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (insisting the lower 
court abused its discretion for denying community visits to a juvenile who presented no 
evidence of violent behavior) (vacated on other grounds, 967 A.2d 776 (Md. 2009)). 
95 See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 4. 
96 See id. (unraveling the most common reasons behind juvenile confinement in 
Maryland). 
97 See Goode, supra note 3 (observing that the judge detained Tanika for missing her 
court date). 
98 See id. (stating that DJS originally refused to pursue the complaint because no one was 
injured in the fight and Tanika did not have any prior involvement with the juvenile 
justice system). 
99 See id. (noting that the judge has the power under Maryland to detain a child if he 
poses a flight risk). 
100 See In re Ann M., 525 A.2d 1054, 1058 (Md. 1987) (explaining that various Maryland 
and state courts have used the contempt power when a juvenile disobeys juvenile court 
orders). 
101 See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-8A-01(m), 3-8A-02(a)(1) (2017) (providing 
the statutory definition of delinquent and the Purpose clause sections relevant to 
delinquent children). 
102 See Goode, supra note 3 (describing Tanika’s emotional state while detained, 
particularly due to the separation from her mother). 
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and the effects of her detention continue to taint her formerly spotless life as 
an Honor Student.103 
The mental health of youth removed from home is a pressing concern of 
child advocates. A DJS intake officer, magistrate, or judge has the authority 
to remove a child from the home for the child’s welfare.104 In determining 
whether to detain an alleged delinquent child, a magistrate weighs a number 
of factors concerning the child’s welfare, including the mental health of the 
child and the child’s compliance in taking medication.105 The Department of 
Juvenile Services estimates that 75 percent of girls and 57 percent of boys 
in detention centers have moderate to severe mental health needs.106 
However, most of the detention centers do not have adequate mental health 
services.107 Therefore, removing a child with mental health needs is not 
necessary for the welfare of a child, and in fact usually adversely affects a 
child’s mental health.108 
The standard for the removal of a child has always been stringent.109 The 
earliest version of the Juvenile Causes Act forbade the System from 
                     
103 See id. (detailing the negative impacts of detention on Tanika’s life, including 
emotional trauma, limited social interactions, and no opportunity to participate in her 
spiritual life). 
104 See MD. CT. RULE 11-112(a) (giving authorization to any judge or intake officer to 
remove a child from the home if it is in the best interest of the child or the community); 
MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-15 (authorizing a judge or intake officer to take a 
child into custody prior to a hearing). 
105 See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02 (2017). 
106 See NICK MORONEY ET AL., MARYLAND JUVENILE JUSTICE MONITORING UNIT, 2016 
SECOND QUARTER REPORT 34 (2016), 
http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/JJM%20Documents/16_Quarter2.pdf 
[hereinafter SECOND QUARTER REPORT] (estimating the mental health needs of juveniles 
in out-of-home placements) [https://perma.cc/N6A7-PP8R]. 
107 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 36 (explaining that children’s 
mental health needs are best served in the community, rather than an institution). 
108 See PATRICK MCCARTHY, ET AL., supra note 16, at 4–6 (describing how social 
scientists have linked institutional environments with more severe mental illness, lower 
employment outcomes, and higher recidivism). 
109 See, e.g., In re Joseph G., 617 A.2d 1086, 1090 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); In re 
Jertrude O., 466 A.2d 885, 893 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (emphasizing that the removal 
of a child from the home is “drastic”). 
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separating youth from families unless necessary for the youth’s well-being 
or in the interests of public safety.110 The Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals interpreted the statute the following year in In re Hamill.111 Based 
on the plain language of the statute, the Court held that Legislature intended 
to maintain the delicate, non-criminal nature of juvenile proceedings in 
order to address the unique needs of adolescents, including disposing of 
cases in the interest of the child’s protection or rehabilitation, rather than 
punishment.112 Therefore, the court held that a child should be in a healthy 
family environment whenever possible, and that an institution is an 
improper venue for a child, whether delinquent or not, to receive 
rehabilitation unless absolutely necessary.113 Moreover, the alcoholism or 
drug addiction of a parent does not necessitate the removal of a child from 
his home, nor does suspected child abuse.114 However, if a child is using 
drugs and habitually running away, and the parents cannot or will not 
provide custody, the court may deem the detention of a child necessary to 
                     
110 See 1969 Md. Laws 82 (stating a primary purpose of the Act was to separate a child 
from his parents “only when necessary for his welfare or in the interests of public 
safety”). 
111 See In re Hamill, 271 A.2d 762, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (interpreting the 
nature of the statute found in 1969 Md. Laws 82). 
112 See id. (noting that “the purposes of the Act were plainly outlined” because the text 
stated that the act “‘ provide[s] for the care, protection and wholesome mental and 
physical development of children . . .’” (quoting 1969 Md. Laws 82)) (emphasis added). 
113 See id. (explaining the Legislature’s preference for parent custody over institutional 
custody). 
114 See In re Joseph G., 617 A.2d 1086, 1090 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (stating that 
depriving a child of his parents is “drastic,” and may not be based on suspected 
allegations, even if the allegations are child abuse); In re William B., 533 A.2d 16, 19 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (finding that substance abuse on its face is not sufficient 
grounds for the removal of a child from his home because the State may only do so if the 
parents are unwilling to provide him ordinary care and attention). 
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protect the child’s welfare.115 An extremely severe crime, such as murder, 
may necessitate the detention of a child in order to protect the public.116 
2. Maryland Detains Youth in Unsafe and Inhumane Detention Centers 
in Violation of the Juvenile Causes Act  
If a judge determines that pretrial detention is indeed necessary for a 
youth alleged delinquent, the Juvenile Causes Act and Maryland common 
law require the state to provide a safe and humane environment with access 
to necessary services.117 The state of Maryland violates this provision by 
detaining children prior to trial in unsafe facilities that are ill-suited to their 
needs.118 
The environment in Maryland’s juvenile detention centers is 
inappropriately punitive and unsafe.119 Regardless of whether a child has 
been detained for their protection or on behalf of public safety, the state has 
only maximum-security (or “hardware-secure”) detention centers for his or 
her detention.120 These maximum security detention centers support 
                     
115 See In re Caitlin N., 994 A.2d 454, 458 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (not contesting the 
trial court’s finding that emergency detention was necessary when the respondent was 
using drugs and her mother was unable to provide supervision at home). 
116 See In re Julianna B., 947 A.2d 90, 95 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (noting that the 
respondent had been detained prior to trial on second-degree murder charges) (vacated on 
other grounds, 967 A.2d 776 (Md. 2009)). 
117 See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(7) (2017) (mandating the provision of a 
“safe, humane, and caring environment” and access to required services for detained 
children); Williams v. Wilzack, 573 A.2d 809, 814 (Md. 1990) (adopting Supreme Court 
precedent granting to persons in State custody safe conditions of confinement, freedom 
from unnecessary bodily restraints, and at least minimal training of staff). 
118 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106 at 18–43 (reporting the high levels of 
violence and abuse in Maryland’s juvenile detention centers). 
119 See id. (noting the inappropriate use of physical restraints and isolation; the high levels 
of violence; and the high levels of mental health needs at Maryland juvenile detention 
facilities). 
120 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 271 (1984) (differentiating between the conditions 
in minimum-security and maximum-security detention centers for juveniles); SECOND 
QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106 at 18–43 (detailing the available detention facilities 
for children, including Lower Eastern Shore Children’s Center, Western Maryland 
Children’s Center, Alfred D. Noyes Children’s Center, Thomas Waxter Children’s 
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punitive policies such as strip-searching children, isolation, and shackling 
certain children when they move in between units.121 These detention 
centers are not substitutions for parental custody; rather, they are hotbeds of 
violence and suicidality.122 Frightening levels of violence exist at detention 
facilities, such as the Baltimore City Juvenile Justice Center (BCJJC) and 
Cheltenham Youth Facility, with as many as sixty-four assaults occurring in 
one quarter, or one roughly every three days.123 With ninety uses of physical 
restraint in the same quarter, the staff of BCJJC is not providing the 
“custody, care, and discipline” that should be provided to youth in DJS 
custody.124 According to the statute, the discipline provided should be that 
of a reasonable parent.125 A reasonable parent’s discipline, under Maryland 
law, does not include excessive physical abuse or exposure to a violent and 
chaotic environment.126 Moreover, Maryland common law guarantees to 
                                            
Center, Charles H. Hickey School, Cheltenham Youth Facility, and Baltimore Juvenile 
Justice Center. Note: Liberty House Shelter is a minimum-security shelter care facility, 
but only has 10 beds and is only available to Baltimore youth). 
121 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 19, 22 (noting the inappropriate 
usage of seclusion and shackling); Erica L. Green, Juveniles in Maryland’s Justice 
System Are Routinely Strip-Searched and Shackled, BALTIMORE SUN (March 13, 2016), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/investigations/bs-md-strip-and-shackle-
20160129-story.html (detailing the excessive use of strip-searching and shackling for 
youth in DJS custody) [https://perma.cc/3AZ4-GU46]. 
122 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 1 (noting the prevalence of suicidal 
ideation at DJS-operated facilities during the quarter). 
123 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 18 (reporting the number of youth 
on youth assaults or fights from April 1 to June 30, or 91 days). 
124 See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC § 3-8A-02(a)(6) (2016). 
125 See id.; see also In re Christiana G., 530 A.2d 771, 774 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) 
(holding that the parent’s discipline was unreasonable and constituted physical abuse, 
therefore in part justifying the removal of the child from the home). 
126 See In re Christiana G., 530 A.2d at 774 (finding that the chaotic environment of the 
home, including physical abuse, posed a risk to the child’s well-being and thus justified 
the drastic step of removing the child from the home). 
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individuals in state custody the right to be free from unreasonable bodily 
restraints.127 
Many Maryland juvenile detention centers are also chronically 
understaffed and overwhelmed by the needs of the population.128 A lack of 
staffing in detention centers may result in drastic consequences for a 
mentally ill child, whose mild agitation may escalate if a staff member is 
not available to respond.129 Escalations of behavior may result in physical 
altercations, seclusion, or shackling.130 When the custodians of a child in 
custody do not provide proper care, death can occur.131 In State v. Kanavy, a 
juvenile died while in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Services at 
the Bowling Brook juvenile facility.132 The Maryland Court of Appeals 
ruled that the laws of Maryland impose a duty to provide the child with 
medical care, as well as a safe, humane, and caring environment.133 The 
Court found that the State could prove the employees knew of their duties to 
the child and disregarded them, denying the child a safe, humane, and 
caring environment.134 The Court, therefore, allowed for the grand jury to 
indict the DJS employees on reckless endangerment charges.135 
                     
127 See Williams v. Wilzack, 573 A.2d 809, 814 (Md. 1990) (adopting Supreme Court 
precedent granting to persons in State mental hospitals, and thus state custody, safe 
conditions of confinement on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds). 
128 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 30 (describing the effect of staffing 
shortages on the operations of the facilities, including shortages of emergency mental 
health treatment). 
129 See id. (detailing incident 136578, where an agitated youth did not receive prompt 
assistance and her behavior escalated into a physical altercation with a DJS staff 
member). 
130 See id. (describing the need for more influence from mental health staff to reduce the 
incidences of shackling and seclusion). 
131 See State v. Kanavy, 4 A.3d 991, 994 (Md. 2010) (describing the death of a juvenile in 
a state facility due to the reckless endangerment of DJS staff). 
132 See id. (voicing concern about the conduct of state employees and their duties to the 
juveniles in their care). 
133 See id. at 995 (stressing the duty that the plain language of MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02 imposes on the Department of Juvenile Services). 
134 See id. at 998 (finding that reckless endangerment charges were appropriate, as the 
State must prove the respondents owed a duty of care to the deceased; the respondents 
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Although the Bowling Brook facility today is no longer in use, Maryland 
continues to operate similar facilities.136 Several of these facilities have had 
alarming issues with violence, including abuse of juveniles by staff.137 
Though the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services is statutorily 
obligated to provide the children in its custody with “access to required 
services” and a “safe, humane, and caring environment,” it fails its duty and 
endangers the lives of the children in its care.138 
B. Even if the Juvenile Causes Act Was Ambiguous, United States Supreme 
Court Jurisprudence Demonstrates That Maryland Should Drastically 
Reduce the Use of Pretrial Detention 
1. The Roper -Miller -Graham-J .D.B.-Montgomery Canon Mandates 
that Unnecessary Juvenile Pretr ial Detention is Prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment  
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution guarantees to all individuals the right not to be 
punished excessively for a transgression.139 In order to establish whether a 
                                            
were aware of the duty; the omission of the duty of care created a substantial risk of 
physical harm; under the circumstances, the respondents would not have disregarded the 
duty of care; and the respondents consciously disregarded their duties). 
135 See id. at 998 (vacating the previous order of the trial court and reinstating the 
indictments so that the Department of Juvenile Services employees may be prosecuted on 
charges of reckless endangerment). 
136 See DJS Pulls Remaining Youths from Bowling Brook, MD. DEP’T JUV. SERV. (Mar. 2, 
2007), http://www.djs.maryland.gov/Documents/press/pr030207.pdf (stating that 
Bowling Brook was shut down after the death of the child in Kanavy) 
[https://perma.cc/V59M-5F8A]; SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 4–43 
(noting that Bowling Brook is not a facility currently in use by the Department of 
Juvenile Services; however, many of the detention and commitment centers have issues 
with staffing, youth safety, and providing adequate psychiatric and medical care).  
137 See id. at 34 (reporting incident 137417, where a child reported being choked by a 
staff member and losing feeling in his chin after being in a physical restraint). 
138 See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(6)–(7) (2017) (providing the 
statutory duty for the Department of Juvenile Services concerning children in its 
custody). 
139 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 569 
(2005) (holding that the death penalty was an excessive punishment for a juvenile 
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practice violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, a court must 
evaluate the jurisdictions’ evolving standards by analyzing the objective 
indicia of a consensus against the practice, as well as whether the practice 
serves legitimate penological goals.140 
Based on the national and state consensus against pretrial detention and 
its lack of penological goals, pretrial detention of juveniles in Maryland 
violates the Cruel & Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.141 Contrary to assertions made thirty-three years ago in Schall 
v. Martin, the national consensus now demonstrates that Maryland’s 
practice of sending alleged delinquent juvenile to pretrial detention no 
longer meets our standards of decency.142 A court’s inquiry into the nation’s 
evolving standards of decency can incorporate legislation and state practice, 
along with the court’s own judgment on the acceptability of the practice.143 
Based on the declining rates of pretrial detention, there exists a consensus in 
both Maryland and the United States in favor of ending confinement 
                                            
because children have an underdeveloped sense of self, and thus their actions cannot be 
as morally reprehensible). 
140 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560 (describing how a court evaluates a practice to determine 
whether there is a violation of the Eighth Amendment); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 67 (2010) (explaining that severe punishments that serve legitimate penological 
goals may be upheld by courts). 
141 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (forbidding the imposition of cruel or unusual 
punishment); MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 25; see also Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (incorporating the Eighth Amendment into the Due Process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Thompson v. Grindle, 688 A.2d 466, 485 (1997) 
(affirming that the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is construed in pari 
materia with Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights). 
142 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 271, 278 (1984) (upholding the New York statute 
authorizing pretrial detention of juveniles in part because of the majority of states that 
had a similar statute, in addition to the determination that it served a legitimate state 
regulatory objective by protecting public safety and the juveniles themselves without 
serving as a punishment); ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 2 (detailing 
the nationwide shift in juvenile detention policy from incarceration to community-based 
services). 
143 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002); Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
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practices.144 Moreover, the Supreme Court precedent of treating juveniles 
less harshly further demonstrates that pretrial detention is not necessary.145 
Therefore, the practice of pretrial detention in Maryland violates the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.146 
The practices and policies of the United States and the Maryland 
Attorney General reflect a general consensus that the practice of 
unnecessary pretrial detention is cruel and costly.147 Despite the early-1990s 
fear-mongering of the supposed juvenile “superpredator,” juvenile crime 
nationwide has steeply declined over the past two decades.148 In response, 
nearly every state has adopted policies to reduce the confinement of 
juveniles, reflecting a nationwide agreement that juveniles are best served in 
the community.149 Moreover, the Maryland Office of the Attorney General 
has officially stated in multiple reports that the courts and the Department 
of Juvenile Services should collaborate to lower the rate of pre-trial 
                     
144 See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 2 (describing the national shift 
in juvenile detention policy from incarceration to community-based services); see also 
SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 2 (describing targeted efforts by DJS to 
reduce intake referrals and thus reduce the number of detained and incarcerated children). 
145 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 
261 (2011); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 
U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (stressing the differences in culpability and penological goals for 
children and adults). 
146 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 25. 
147 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 36 (citing the research on juvenile 
confinement of the Annie E. Casey Foundation in adopting the position that juvenile 
detention and incarceration is extremely costly while providing no additional benefit for 
public safety or outcomes for children); JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, FACTSHEET: THE 
TIP OF THE ICEBERG: WHAT TAXPAYERS PAY TO INCARCERATE YOUTH (2015) 
(reporting the average of juvenile incarceration as $401 per day, per juvenile) (hereinafter 
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE 2015) [https://perma.cc/W3AX-2K95]. 
148 See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 2 (reporting on the steep decline 
nationwide in juvenile crime). 
149 See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, CALCULATING THE FULL PRICE TAG FOR YOUTH 
INCARCERATION, 5 (2014) 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/sticker_shock_final_v2.pd
f (highlighting the “juvenile deincarceration” trend that has steadily progressed since 
2001, due to advances in research and policymaking) [hereinafter JUSTICE POLICY 
INSTITUTE 2014]. 
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detention.150 The Office of the Attorney General has also implemented 
additional “deincarceration” programs in recent years, such as the 
nationally-known Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiatives of the Annie E. 
Casey Foundation, which attempts to divert youth out of the juvenile justice 
system during the early stages of delinquency proceedings.151 
When evaluating whether a general consensus against a practice exists, 
the U.S. Supreme Court looks at how often a practice is actually used.152 In 
Graham, the Court examined the actual sentencing practices of the thirty-
seven states that permitted life without parole sentences for nonhomicide 
juvenile offenders.153 The Court found that because the sentences were 
imposed so infrequently, this was indicative of a consensus against the use 
of the practice.154 Applying the same logic, there exists a general consensus 
against the widespread use of pretrial detention because many courts across 
the nation have ceased the practice despite laws authorizing it.155 Indeed, 
many states, including Maryland, continue to reauthorize statutory juvenile 
                     
150 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 4; NICK MARONEY ET AL., 
MARYLAND JUVENILE JUSTICE MONITORING UNIT, 2016 THIRD QUARTER REPORT 3 
(2016) 
http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/JJM%20Documents/JJMU%20Q3%202016%2
0Report_%20final_Dec%2022.pdf [hereinafter THIRD QUARTER REPORT] (encouraging 
the Maryland courts and the Department to work together to limit detention and 
commitment for fiscal and efficiency reasons). 
151 See THIRD QUARTER REPORT, supra note 150, at 3–4 (encouraging the expansion of 
initiatives such as the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative because such community-
based interventions positively effect youth outcomes and are more cost-efficient). 
152 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010) (“There are measures of consensus 
other than legislation.” (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 433 (2008)). 
153 See id. at 62 (incorporating recent studies of juvenile life without parole sentencing 
practices to find that the practice was infrequently implemented). 
154 See id. at 62–63 (finding there was a general consensus against the practice, despite 
the State’s contention that the studies were not peer-reviewed and incomplete). 
155 See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 2 (citing SARAH HOCKENBERRY 
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, JUVENILES IN RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT, 2013, JUVENILE 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL REPORT SERIES, May 2016, at 6, 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/249507.pdf (noting that despite the continued existence of 
statutes that permit juvenile pretrial detention, the population of detained delinquents has 
decreased thirty-six percent from 1997-2003)). 
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pretrial detention schemes.156 Nationwide, the practice of detaining youth 
has declined dramatically since 1997, from over 26,000 to just below 
17,000 residents.157 
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court juvenile jurisprudence lends to the 
logical conclusion that juvenile pretrial detention violates the right of the 
juvenile to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Under the Roper-
Miller-Graham-J.D.B.-Montgomery line of cases, the Supreme Court 
established a firm precedent that “age is more than a chronological fact,” 
and that adult penalties and procedures may not apply to children as 
harshly.158 To support this conclusion, the Court identified three primary 
characteristics of children particularly relevant to treatment within the 
criminal justice system.159 First, due to the underdevelopment of the 
juvenile brain, children lack maturity and responsibility, causing them to be 
more prone to risk-taking and reckless decision-making.160 The structure of 
the human brain responsible for executive functioning does not mature until 
very late adolescence; therefore, children lack the fully-formed brain 
                     
156 See, e.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 152.0015 (2017) (permitting the pretrial detention 
of children); ALA. CODE § 12-15-208 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-133(b)–(e) 
(2017); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-15 (2017). 
157 See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 2 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
JUVENILES IN RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT, 2013 6 (2016) 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/249507.pdf) (noting that only 2011 data was available, but 
2013 is now the most recent available). 
158See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (finding that the diminished 
culpability of juveniles, due to their age, cannot rationalize major penological 
justifications); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (prohibiting sentences of life 
without parole for nonhomicide offenders); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 275 
(2011) (emphasizing that children are more psychologically vulnerable and thus are 
deserving of additional protections in the criminal justice system); Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life sentences without parole for 
juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 
718 (2016) (holding that the Miller rule should be applied retroactively). 
159 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (establishing the three broad reasons as to why the conduct 
of juveniles is not as “morally reprehensible”). 
160 Id. at 569; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (relying on amici briefs 
to support the contention that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to 
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds”). 
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structure that is responsible for planning, decision-making, and evaluating 
risk.161 A child has no influence over his or her brain maturation and thus 
cannot be found as liable for his or her transgressions.162 Therefore, 
detaining a child prior to adjudication is an excessive sanction for any 
alleged offense.163 
Second, children are more vulnerable to outside influences and 
psychological trauma, rendering them more susceptible to negative pressure 
of authority figures and peers.164 This vulnerability, coupled with children’s 
lack of institutional independence, also limits children’s abilities to extricate 
themselves from “crime-producing” settings, such as abusive homes, 
violent neighborhoods, and bullying in schools.165 Given the violent and 
unsafe nature of the Maryland detention centers, the vulnerability of 
children in Maryland detention centers is of particular concern.166 As the 
neuronal development of children is fragile and more susceptible to trauma, 
the confinement of a child in unsafe and violent detention center prior to 
trial is disproportionately harsh.167 
                     
161 See Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric 
Association, National Association of Social Workers, and Mental Health America as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 24–28; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) 
(Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 WL 2236778, at *40–43. 
162 See id. 
163 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64 (explaining that juveniles have diminished 
culpability due, in part, to the underdevelopment of the brain, and thus mandatory 
sentencing schemes that do not consider the transient recklessness of youth are 
unconstitutional). 
164 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 
(1982) (recognizing the increased psychological vulnerability of children); cf. J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 275 (2011) (ordering the consideration of age into the 
Miranda analysis, in part because children are significantly more susceptible to 
manipulation and pressure). 
165 See Roper at 553, 569–70 (observing a child’s lack of control over his or her lack of 
environment, and therefore rendering a juvenile’s conduct less “morally reprehensible”). 
166 See THIRD QUARTER REPORT, supra note 150, at 1, 10–13 (describing the lack of 
staffing, increase in assaults and fights, and inappropriate use of restraints at Maryland 
youth detention centers). 
167 See id.; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (discussing how the increased 
psychological vulnerability of children can be taken into account during sentencing). 
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Third, a child’s character and personality are not well-formed throughout 
childhood and adolescence.168 Children struggle to define their identities; 
therefore, qualities such as rebelliousness and impulsiveness are often 
impermanent and fade with maturation into adulthood.169 Thus, a crime 
committed by a child struggling to define his identity cannot be considered 
evidence that the child is incorrigible,170 especially when the alleged crime 
is a small skirmish, such as Tamika’s case. 
Moreover, the Roper-Miller-Graham-J.D.B.-Montgomery line of 
Supreme Court juvenile jurisprudence directly seeks to overturn Schall v. 
Martin.171 In the early 1980s, juveniles accounted for 17.3 percent of arrests 
for violent person and property crimes.172 Justice Rehnquist opined at the 
time that the harm to society caused by juvenile crime was greater than that 
of adult crime.173 Today, however, children under the age of eighteen 
account for just 2 percent of all property offense arrests and 6 percent of all 
violent offense arrests.174 Additionally, the Court based its decision in part 
on what they saw as adequate conditions of confinement for juveniles in 
                     
168 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 553, 570 (2005) (describing how qualities such as recklessness 
in youth are often fleeting and impermanent, and thus it is improper to compare the 
failings of children with adults). 
169 See id. (citing advancements in behavioral science to support the notion that children 
struggle to define their identities and thus have unstable self-concepts). 
170 See id. (stating that it would be morally indefensible to compare the “failings” of a 
child with an adult, as a child’s unstable self-concept renders him less capable of 
incorrigibility). 
171 See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 275 (2011) (emphasizing that 
children are significantly more susceptible to manipulation and should be given special 
considerations in custody); Roper, 543 U.S. at 553, 569–70 (observing a child’s lack of 
control over his or her lack of environment, and therefore rendering a juvenile’s conduct 
less “morally reprehensible”). 
172 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 fn.14 (1984) (citing Department of Justice 
statistics in support of the State’s assertion that juvenile crime was a public safety issue). 
173 See id. at 265 (explaining that juvenile offenders may harm society worse due to their 
increased potential for recidivism). 
174 BRIAN A. REAVES, PH.D., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE 
URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES, 5–6 (Dec. 2013) (providing the most 
recent age demographics of defendants committing violent personal and property crimes) 
[https://perma.cc/4FC4-K825]. 
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pretrial detention.175 These conditions included “nonsecure detention,” 
without any locked doors, bars, or shackling,; or secure detention, where 
children were allowed to wear “street clothes” and partake in educational 
and recreational programs.176 Maryland, meanwhile, only provides secure 
detention for juveniles in pretrial detention.177 In these secure facilities, 
violence, suicidality, and abuse is rampant.178 In certain facilities, on 
average, at least one reported assault occurs every three days.179 As children 
move through the facilities or are transported elsewhere, such as court or 
health appointments, they are routinely strip-searched and shackled.180 
These strict policies even apply to children who are detained on low-level 
offenses.181 During the day at the facilities, detained children are provided 
the bare bones of an educational opportunity, but little else.182 The dated 
precedent of Schall does not stand in light of the demands of the Roper-
Miller-Graham-J.D.B.-Montgomery line of cases, the evolving national 
consensus, and the changing statistics.183 
                     
175 See Schall, 467 U.S. at 270 (noting that the conditions of confinement for juveniles 
reflected the regulatory purposes of New York’s statute). 
176 See id. at 271 (describing the conditions of confinement as testified to in the trial). 
177 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 4–39 (detailing that Maryland 
detention centers for juveniles are all maximum-security, or hardware-secure). 
178 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 1, 18-19, 25-27, 31, 33-35 
(reporting the incidences of suicidality, assaults, and staff-on-child abuse that occurred in 
detention centers). 
179 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 18 (reporting the number of youth 
on youth assaults or fights from April 1 to June 30, or 91 days). 
180 See Green, supra note 121 (reporting on the excessive use of strip-searching and 
shackling of youth in Maryland detention facilities and the psychological trauma inflicted 
on youths). 
181 See Green, supra note 121, (noting that the strip-searching and shackling policies 
apply to every youth, even those who pose little to no risk of flight or a threat). 
182 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106; Green, supra note 121, id. at 22–24 
(describing the multiple issues with education and activities access, including but not 
limited to staffing problems, persistent boredom, youth having insufficient schoolwork, 
and a youth earning his diploma but not having access to any higher education). 
183 REAVES, supra note 174, at 6, Table 3 (providing the statistics that detail a dramatic 
drop from the early 1980s to today in crimes committed by juveniles); see J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 275 (2011) (citing the Roper, Miller, Graham line of cases while 
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IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
A. Maryland Must Severely Curtail Pretrial Detention of Juveniles and 
Offer Community-Based Services to Juvenile Offenders Awaiting Trial 
It is clear that judicial discretion allows for the rampant unnecessary 
detention of Maryland juveniles in unsafe facilities.184 The detention of 
Maryland juveniles is enormously expensive, as well, costing an average of 
$341 per day.185 In order to severely curtail this practice, Maryland must 
invest in a two-pronged approach that challenges judicial discretion and 
provides effective community services for juveniles awaiting trial. 
Maryland should first dramatically expand funding to the Detention 
Response Unit of the Maryland Office of the Public Defender (OPD). In 
1995, OPD formed the Detention Response Unit in order to respond to the 
growing problem of children detained before trial.186 Individual teams, 
comprised of a lawyer and a social worker, investigated each claim, found 
temporary shelter solutions, and argued to move the child to less restrictive 
alternatives.187 The program cost $74 per day on average, yet the unit saved 
the state $1,480 per child.188 The holistic, juvenile-focused approach of the 
OPD unit, which also received special training and controlled caseloads, 
was identified as a highly effective program for indigent juveniles by social 
                                            
discussing the drastic differences between children and adults, and why children therefore 
must be afforded special considerations in the criminal justice system). 
184 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 1, 18 (reporting the high levels of 
suicidality and violence that exists at detention centers); see ANNIE E. CASEY 
FOUNDATION, supra note 73, at 4–6 (describing how Maryland courts unnecessarily 
detain children prior to trial through technical violations). 
185 See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE 2015, supra note 147, at 2, note 50 (reporting the 
average cost of confinement of juveniles in Maryland in 2014). 
186 EDWARD W. SIEH, COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, 315 (1st ed. 
2005) (noting that the Detention Response Unit was one of two research-backed OPD 
units that addressed specific populations in order to decrease incarceration and increase 
positive community outcomes). 
187 See id. (describing the respective roles of the social worker and the lawyer team). 
188 See N. LEE COOPER ET AL., Fulfilling the Promise of In Re Gault: Advancing the Role 
of Lawyers for Children, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 651, 660 n.90 (1998) (lauding the 
cost-benefit analysis of the Unit’s Final Progress Report). 
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scientists in the 1990s.189 By re-implementing the Detention Response 
Team across the state, Maryland will set up a check against trial court 
judges who wish to expand the meaning of “necessary to public safety” and 
limit commitment to youth who have committed very dangerous crimes.190 
Maryland should additionally divest in large youth detention centers and 
reinvest in small, community-based programming. In 2013, researchers 
from the National Bureau of Economic Research published a study that 
found a correlation between youth confinement and a 13.3 percent drop in 
the likelihood of graduation from high school, as well as a nearly  25 
percent higher adult recidivism rate.191 Multiple jurisdictions have reacted 
by implementing pipeline-reduction initiatives, including New York City.192 
When New York City implemented the Close to Home initiative, a program 
that closed large, upstate facilities and moved youth to small home-like 
placements, youth incarceration fell by 55 percent, and youth arrests 
declined by half.193 The Close to Home initiative also included a range of 
detention alternatives, including short-term crisis management, 
Multisystemic Therapy, and Functional Family Therapy, resulting in 
reduced detention and pre-adjudication arrest rates.194 The State of 
                     
189 See id. (imparting the importance of retaining knowledgeable and well-trained juvenile 
attorneys representing children so that clients are not inappropriately detained). 
190 See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(5) (2017) (allowing the court to 
remove a child from a home if in the interest of public safety); PATRICK MCCARTHY, ET 
AL., supra note 16, at 18 (discussing how youth confinement and youth offending 
declined when states limited the power of judges to detain children to statutorily-defined 
offenses). 
191 See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE 2014, supra note 147, at 22, 30 (citing Aizer & 
Doyle’s 2013 study on nearly 37,000 youth processed by the Juvenile Court of Cook 
County in Chicago to study the impacts of confinement). 
192 PATRICK MCCARTHY, ET AL., supra note 16, at 11, 14, 20, 23 (noting that Texas, New 
York City, Massachusetts, and California experienced dramatic reductions in crime and 
youth arrests when the jurisdictions implemented initiatives to reduce the amount of 
confined youths). 
193 See id. at 23 (describing the reform efforts implemented by New York City to 
appropriately match child needs while in custody and improve outcomes). 
194 See id. (noting that by initiating a new risk-assessment tool and a range of detention 
alternatives, New York City likely also reduced youth committed post-adjudication). 
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Maryland should implement similar alternatives to pretrial detention, such 
as evidence-based, economically-friendly programs like the Adolescent 
Diversion Project, mentoring programs, Multisystemic Therapy, Functional 
Family Therapy, and Communities that Care.195 These programs can cost as 
little as $75 per day while achieving better outcomes.196 The Annie E. 
Casey Foundation’s Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiatives, a similar 
program, was established in Baltimore City in 2012. The program has 
already experienced success in limiting the number of juveniles committed 
post-adjudication.197 The Attorney General of Maryland has declared 
support for these initiatives and urges the State and the Department of 
Juvenile Services to take further action for the benefit of the children and 
taxpayers alike.198 
V. CONCLUSION 
Under the Juvenile Causes Act, a child who is alleged delinquent should 
not be separated from his or her family unless the welfare of the child or 
public safety is threatened.199 If the child is detained in the custody of the 
State, the Department of Juvenile Services must provide a safe, humane, 
                     
195 See id. at 10-13 (presenting various evidence-based, research-based, and promising 
practices for children in the juvenile justice system, including the excellent cost-benefit 
analysis on each). 
196 See PATRICK MCCARTHY, ET AL., supra note 16 at 21 (noting that community-based 
services for youth are a “win-win” in that they provide more effective programs at a 
lower cost). 
197 See RICHARD E. MENDEL, JUVENILE DETENTION ALTERNATIVES INITIATIVE 
PROGRESS REPORT 2014, 14–16 (2014) http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-
2014JDAIProgressReport-2014.pdf#page=18 (reporting that although Baltimore City 
experienced a 43 percent drop in commitments, the average daily population in facilities 
rose by seven percent) [https://perma.cc/EE4L-SBVP]. 
198 See SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106 at 2, 43 (adopting the position that 
juvenile detention and incarceration is extremely costly while providing no additional 
benefit for public safety or outcomes for children). 
199 See MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(5) (2017) (stating the importance of 
strengthening and preserving the family unit). 
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and caring environment.200 Maryland’s current practice of inappropriately 
detaining juveniles prior to adjudication violates the stated purposes of the 
Juvenile Causes Act for children alleged delinquent.201 Maryland’s courts 
unnecessarily detain its youth and subsequently detain them in abhorrent 
conditions that provide neither a safe nor comfortable environment.202 
Moreover, this practice is contrary to Supreme Court juvenile jurisprudence 
under Constitutional Law.203 By unnecessarily detaining children prior to 
trial in unsuitable conditions, Maryland violates the Eighth Amendment and 
denies juveniles the special protections afforded to children in the criminal 
justice system.204 In order to mitigate this crisis, Maryland must invest in 
initiatives to drastically curtail the population of children in detention.205 
 
                     
200 See id. § 3-8A-02(a)(6)–(7) (emphasizing the importance of securing for a child a 
similar environment to that which should have been provided by his parents). 
201 Compare MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02(a)(5) (2002), with SECOND 
QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106 at 18–40 (reporting and investigating the high 
incidences of assault, uses of physical restraint and shackling, and suicidal behavior in 
Maryland 
202 See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 73 at 4 (noting that the most common 
reason for juvenile confinement in Maryland is technical violations of court orders); 
SECOND QUARTER REPORT, supra note 106, at 19, 22 (noting the inappropriate usage of 
seclusion and shackling). 
203 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 
(2011); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104, 115 (1982) (stressing the differences penological goals for children and adults). 
204 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (finding that the young age of juveniles affords them 
special protections because “youth is more than a chronological fact”). 
205 See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE 2014, supra note 147, at 38; PATRICK MCCARTHY, ET 
AL., supra note 16, at 21–23 (recommending community-based programs, probation 
reforms, targeted public defender strategies, and prosocial development to reduce 
detention and commitment at a lower cost while reducing crime). 
